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II.

A.

STATEM ENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case.

This case began as an action for the alleged breach of an oral lease agreement and waste
brought by Plaintiff Douglas Visser (hereinafter "Doug"), against Defendants Vicki Visser,
Calvin Visser, and Auto Alley, LLC (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Vicki"). Doug and
Vicki were previously married, and upon their divorce, their real property was awarded to Doug.
However, Vicki continued to occupy a portion of the real property, upon which she continued to
operate an automobile salvage and crushing business (hereinafter "Junk Yard"). After years of
operating the Junk Yard, Doug sued Vicki, seeking to have her removed from the property.
On August 15, 2013, the parties attended mediation and entered into a Mediated
Settlement Agreement ("MSA"), thereby extinguishing all prior claims. (P's Ex. 31 ).

The

District Court entered a Stipulated Judgment based upon the MSA. (P's Ex. 17). Pursuant to the
terms of the Stipulated Judgment, Doug agreed to convey title to a portion of the real property,
known as Lot 2, to Vicki, subject to a number of conditions. (Id.). Among the conditions, the
parties were to have the property platted, so that it could be legally split and conveyed. Also,
each party was to assume half of an existing mortgage, which was in favor of an individual by
the name of Joe Lapham (hereinafter the "Lapham Mortgage."). (Id.).
Vicki substantially performed under the Agreement. She paid more than $45,000 in back
real estate taxes, paid down her share of the shared mortgage from approximately $180,000 to
approximately $30,000, obtained and provided a Phase I Environmental report, moved the entire
Junk Yard from Lot 1 to Lot 2, paid for the completion of a plat splitting the property into Lot 1
and Lot 2, and graveled and leveled the properties at her own expense. Nevertheless, the District
Court ruled that Vicki and the other Defendants forfeited all of their investment on account of
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three breaches of the Stipulated Judgment: (I) the leaving of a small amount of personal property
on Lot I; (2) the continued use of a small portion of a road located on Lot 1; and (3) the failure to
pay the entire amount of Vicki's share of the Lapham Mortgage. The District Court refused to
apply an equitable analysis to the issue of whether the remedy provided in the Stipulated
Judgment constituted an inequitable penalty
It is Vicki' s position that the District Court erred in failing to apply binding precedent,
that the remedy provision in the Stipulated Judgment constitutes an unenforceable liquidated
damage provision, resulting in a windfall to Doug. Vicki also contends that the District Court's
finding that Doug did not interfere with Vicki' s ability to pay off the remainder of the Lapham
Mortgage is not supported by the evidence admitted at trial, and is, in fact, contradicted by four
different witnesses , including Doug himself.
These errors require the reversal and remand of the District Court' s findings.

B.

The Course of the Proceedings.
1.

On June 25, 2013, Doug filed a Complaint for waste and breach of contract,

together with an application for a pre-judgment writ of attachment and a temporary restraining
order. (R. Vol. I, p. 28).
2.

The District Court entered the temporary restraining order on July 3, 2013. (R.

Vol. I, p.64).
3.

On or about October 15, 2013 the parties attended mediation and entered into a

mediated settlement agreement ("MSA") . (R. Vol. I, p. 109)
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4.

On or about January 16, 2014, Counsel for Doug prepared and faxed a copy of the

proposed Stipulated Judgment to the District Court. (R. Vol. I, p. 87).
5.

On or about February 19, 2014, the District Court entered the proposed Stipulated

Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 89)
6.

The Stipulated Judgment obligates Doug to convey to Vicki title to the 6.2 acres of

the real property designated as Lot 2, upon the satisfaction of the conditions set forth therein. (R.
Vol. I, p. 90, ,r A(l); Plaintiff's Ex. 12). Doug was to retain Lot 1.
7.

On April 3, 2014, Doug filed a motion for writ of possession and judgment of

quiet title, seeking to eliminate any right of ownership of Vicki in Lot 2. An evidentiary hearing
was held on April 23, 2014. (R. Vol. I, p. 103).
8.

After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court found that Vicki had substantially

complied with the Stipulated Judgment and denied Doug's motion. (R. Vol. I, p. 103).
9.

On May 7, 2014, Vicki filed a motion entitled Motion Re: Plaintiff's Interference

with Defendants' Ability to Comply with the Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 144).
10.

A hearing was held on Vicki' s Motion for Interference on May 21 , 2014.

Following the hearing, the District Court denied Vicki's motion. (R. Vol. I, p. 159).
11 .

On March 26, 2015, Vicki filed a motion for contempt. (R. Vol. I, p. 164).

12.

On March 27, 2015, Doug filed a second motion for writ of possession and quiet

title. (R. Vol. I, p. 173).
13.

An evidentiary hearing was held to address both motions on May 20, 28, and 29,

2015.
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14.

Following the three day evidentiary hearing, the District Court entered its findings

and conclusio ns of law. (R. Vol. ill, p. 466).
15.

Vicki moved the District Court to reconsider its decision on July 20, 2015. (R.

Vol. III, p. 495).
16.

Following the August 5th hearing on Vicki's motion to reconsider, the District

Court issued its Second Memoran dum Decision and Order denying relief to Vicki. (R. Vol. III,
p. 564).
17.

C.

Vicki timely appealed the District Court's decisions.

Statement of Facts.

I.

On August 15, 2013, the parties to this action entered into a Mediated Settlement

Agreement, resolving disputes regarding ownership of real property located in Ponderay, Idaho,
and related issues (hereinafter the "MSA"). (Plaintiff 's Exhibit 31 ).
2.

On February 19, 2014, the Court entered a Judgmen t (hereinafter "Stipulated

Judgmen t") pursuant to the Mediated Settleme nt Agreement. (R. Vol. I, p. 89).
3.

Pursuant to the Judgment, Douglas Visser was to split the property into two

parcels via the platting process, and to convey to Vicki Visser Lot 2 upon the Defendants'
performance of certain obligations, which included vacating Lot 1, commissioning a Phase I
Environmental Study, providing a copy of said study to the Plaintiff' s Counsel, and paying off
Vicki Visser' s half of the mortgage the parties owed to lender Joe Lapham. Id.
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22.

Consequently, Vicki filed a motion for contempt, asking the Court to find Doug in

in the
contempt for interfering with Vicki's ability to obtain Lot 2, and for liquidating the equity
property via the refinance. (R. Vol. I, p. 164).
23.

The following day, Doug filed a second motion for a writ of possession and an

on the
action to quiet title to Lot 2. (R. Vol. I, p. 173). A three-day evidentiary hearing was held
motions.
24.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the parties submitted written arguments to the

ble
District Court. Vicki argued that the relief being sought by Doug constitutes an inequita
of her
forfeiture, given the time, money, and resources that Vicki had put towards performance
obligations in the Stipulated Judgment.

Specifically, she argued that the provisions of the

on
Stipulated Judgment providing Doug with the right to apply for an immediate writ of possessi
n and
for any failure to perform constituted an unenforceable liquidated damage provisio
Vol. II,
consequently, the relief sought by Doug could not be granted by the District Court. (R.
p. 359).

25.

Vicki presented evidence in support of her arguments that she had already paid

.77 in
more than $130,000.00 in payments towards her half of the Lapham Mortgage, $45,418
.00 to
back real estate taxes owing on Lots 1 and 2, $2,000.00 in subdivision costs, $16,000
repair
gravel the property, $3,000.00 to level the property, $12,800 in rental equipment to
study.
Doug' s portion of the real property, and $2,400.00 to complete a Phase I environmental
(Defendants'Ex. H).
26.

Vicki also argued that Doug had unreasonably prevented her from fully complying

with the terms of the Judgment. Specifically, she presented evidence that:
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a. Vicki had arranged and received approval from Joe Lapham, the holder of the
Lapham Mortgage, to refinance the remaining $30,000.00 owing by Vicki on the
Lapham Mortgage, using Lot 2 as collateral for the refinance. (Plaintiff's Ex. 4;
Tr. Vol. III, p. 104-105; p. 178-179; p. 237, L. 11-17; p.307-308).
b. Doug, nevertheless, refused to allow Lot 2 to be used as collateral for a refinance
until Vicki completed additional tasks not set forth in the Judgment, including:
1.

The construction of a new road by November l, 2014 upon Lot 1, on the
parcel to be retained by Doug;

11.

The repair of a parking lot located upon Doug's real property;

m. The completion of additional environmental studies to include a "clean bill
of environmental health" for Lot 1; and
1v. That Vicki obtain her own water meter and service by Novembe r 1, 2014.
(Plaintiff's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 128-129; p.179, L.7-23; p. 254, L.21-25,
p.255, L.1-23; p. 308, L.17-25; p. 309, L. 1-20; p. 392, L. 2-22; p. 417418).
27.

Among the findings in its First Memorandum Decision and Order granting the

Plaintiff' s motion for a writ of possession, the District Court found that Vicki had failed to
comply with the obligations of the Judgment and that Doug had secured a new loan using Lots 1
and Lot 2 as collateral. Specifically, the Court found:
1.

Vicki did not fully vacate and restore Lot 1 by the April 30 deadline.
Specifically, Vicki left some items of personal property on Lot 1; failed to
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repair some damage to the buildings on Lot 1 caused by the move; and
used portion of a road on Lot 1 to access Lot 2;
11.

That Vicki did not pay all of her half of the Lapham Mortgage on or
before June 30, 2014;

111.

District Court did not make a specific finding as to the sums paid by Vicki
towards the debt, or the other improvements Vicki made to Lots 1 and 2.
(R. Vol. III, p. 466).

28.

After the hearing on the Motion for Reconsideration, the District Court issued its

Second Memorandum Decision and Order. In that Order, the District Court failed to properly
analyze the issues presented in Vicki's Motion for Reconsideration.

III.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

a. Was the forfeiture provision contained within the Stipulated Judgment enforceable by
the District Court, does the record support the District Court's order granting the
forfeiture, or did the District Court abuse its discretion in granting the forfeiture?

b. Did Doug prevent Vicki from complying with the terms of the Stipulated Judgment
and, if so, is Vicki thereby excused from nonperformance?

c. Is Vicki entitled to attorney fees on appeal?
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IV.

ARGUMENT

a. The District Court Should not have Enforced the Forfeiture Provision Contained
within the Stipulated Judgment.
i. The District Court Erred in Finding that the Rules of Equity Did Not
Apply to Vicki's Claims Because There was no Underlying Contract.

The District Court found there was no underlying contract between the parties, thus the
' equitable defenses' raised by Vicki at trial and upon reconsideration were inapplicable. This
finding is clearly erroneous and should be set aside.
"Formation of a contract is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to
resolve." Inland Title Co. v. Comstock, 116 Idaho 701 , 702, 779 P.2d 15, 16 (1989). "A trial
court's findings of fact will not be set aside on appeal unless the findings are clearly erroneous. If
the findings of fact are based upon substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, they
will not be overturned on appeal." Akers v. Mortensen, 147 Idaho 39, 43, 205 P.3d 1175, 1179
(2009).
In its First Memorandum Decision, the District Court found that the damage provision in
the Stipulated Judgment was enforceable because the terms of the Stipulated Judgment were
unambiguous. (R. Vol. III, p. 473).

Thereafter, Vicki filed a Motion for Reconsideration,

arguing, in part, that the Court erred in finding the damage provision enforceable simply because
the terms were unambiguous. (Id. at 498). Vicki reiterated her argument that the District Court
must make a finding as to whether the damage provision in the Stipulated Judgment resulted in
an arbitrary, exorbitant, and unconscionable penalty, and whether the provision was reasonably
related to the anticipated damages. (Id. at 499). After a hearing on the Motion to Reconsider,
the District Court issued its Second Memorandum Decision (Id. at 564). In this decision, the

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 15

District Court again rejected the argument that the contract enforced an illegal penalty, finding
instead that there was no underlying contract between the parties to support Vicki's proposed
defense. (Id. at 570).
This conclusion is clearly erroneous. Idaho case law is very clear that a contract is
formed when a judgment is entered by stipulation. Jim & Maryann Plane Family Trust v.

Skinner, 157 Idaho 927, 342 P.3d 639, 645 (2015) (" ... A stipulation is a contract, [and] its
enforceability is determined through contract principles."). There is no question that the parties
in this matter entered into a stipulation, which was a product of mediation, and a Judgment was
entered based upon that stipulation. (R. Vol. I, p. 89; R. Vol. Ill, p. 567). A stipulation being a
contract, the District Court's finding that there was no contract between the parties is clearly
erroneous and should be set aside.

ii. The Court Erred by Refusing to Apply the Analysis Required by Graves
and its Progeny, as to Whether the Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated

Judgment is an Unenforceable Penalty.
It her post-trial briefing and in her motion for reconsideration, Vicki argued that the relief
sought by Doug constituted a penalty for breach of contract and is therefore unenforceable by a
court in equity. (R. Vol. II, p. 380-384; R. Vol. III, p. 498-501). As noted above, the District
Court rejected Vicki's argument, first on the grounds that the terms of the judgment were
unambiguous, then because it found there was no contract between the parties. Whether the
contract is ambiguous has no bearing on whether the principals of equity apply in this case. The
rules of equity do not somehow vanish so long as the terms of the contract are unambiguous.
There is neither any precedent supporting this position, nor any policy basis for its application.
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The Court has the power of equity regardless of the clarity of the draftsmanship of the underlying
Stipulated Judgment. Moreover, as noted above, there can be no doubt that a contract existed
between the parties in the form of the Stipulated Judgment. Respectfully, it was error for the
District Court to find the cases cited by Vicki inapplicable to the facts of this case.
Vicki maintains on appeal that the rule from Graves3 and its progeny are applicable to
this case. That rule was recently summarized by this Court thusly;
Parties to an agreement may fix damages in the event of breach,
but this power is not without limits. "Historically, courts of equity
developed a rule, later adopted by courts of law, that contractual
clauses prescribing penalties for a breach of the contract would not
be enforced because of the potential for over-reaching and
unconscionable bargains." Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v.
Meyer, 133 Idaho llO, ll7, 982 P.2d 945,952 (Ct.App.1999). This
rule exists today. "Modem courts continue to refuse to enforce
contract clauses that appear designed to deter a breach or to punish
the breaching party rather than compensate the injured party for
damage occasioned by the breach." Id. Indeed, if a forfeiture is
"simply a penalty invoked as a result of conduct of one of the
parties, the forfeiture will not be allowed." Fleming v. Hathaway,
107 Idaho 157, 161, 686 P.2d 837, 841 (Ct.App.1984); see also
Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796, 801, 606 P.2d 90, 95 (1980)
("We have long held in Idaho that the purpose of awarding
damages for breach of contract is to fully recompense the nonbreaching party for its losses sustained because of the breach, not
to punish the breaching party.").
In Idaho, "where the forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract is
arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated
damage, and is exorbitant and unconscionable, it is regarded as a
'penalty,' and the contractual provision therefor is void and
unenforceable." Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d
1020, 1023 (1954) (overruled in part on other grounds by Benz v.
D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167 (2012)). The party
seeking to invalidate a forfeiture provision bears the burden of

3

Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 , 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954) (overruled in part on other
grounds by Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167 (2012)
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proving that the damages provided for by the provision amount to
a penalty, either because the sum to be forfeited does not bear a
reasonable relation to actual damages or because the agreed
amount is exorbitant or unreasonable. Howard v. Bar Bell Land &
Cattle Co. , 81 Idaho 189,197, 340 P.2d 103, 107 (1959); Fleming,
107 Idaho at 161,686 P.2d at 841 .
Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 927, 318 P.3d 910,917 (2014).

This rule is not limited solely to land sale contracts, as argued by Doug and erroneously
held by the District Court. In fact, the case cited above, Melaleuca, is an employment dispute
that deals with the enforceability of a liquidated damage provision contained within a noncompete agreement. None of the cases cited by Vicki are limited to contracts for the sale of land,
and Doug provides no precedent so limiting these principles of equity.
Since the defense argued by Vicki is applicable to the contract between these parties, it
was the duty of the District Court to determine whether the facts supported that defense. In
applying Graves, the District Court should have made a finding as to whether there was a
forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract. Then the District Court should have made findings as
to whether the sum forfeited bears a reasonable relation to actual damages or whether the agreed
amount is exorbitant or unreasonable.
Although the District Court did not make an explicit finding as to whether there was a
forfeiture or damage fixed by the contract, it did acknowledge that its decision worked a
forfeiture upon Vicki, just not an inequitable penalty.4 The holding is puzzling because only a
few sentences prior to reaching that conclusion, the District Court found that the Graves analysis
was inapplicable and would not be entertained. (R. Vol. ill, p. 570). As a result, the District

4

" • •• when the equities are balanced, the forfeiture granted in favor of Doug is not
unconscionable and does not constitute and [sic] inequitable penalty." (R. Vol. III, p. 570).
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Court did not engage in any sort of analysis of the penalty and whether it was unconscionable,
and made no findings as to how the considerable investment made by Vicki into the properties
was reasonably related to the damages suffered by Doug. Id.
In fact, as proven at trial, Vicki invested substantially both in terms of money and labor in

an effort to satisfy her obligations under the Stipulated Judgment, and to effectively purchase Lot
2, including: the payment of more than $130,000 toward the Lapham Mortgage; the payment of
more than $45,000 toward back real estate taxes for Lot 1 and Lot 2; providing a Phase I
environmental impact study at a cost of $2,400; providing $2,000 to complete the platting of the
property into Lot 1 and Lot 2; moving the entire Junk Yard onto Lot 2; spending $31,800 for
gravel, equipment rental, and leveling the property, including the parking lot located on Lot 1;
and arranging to refinance the remaining $30,000 owing on her half of the Lapham Mortgage.
(Defendants'Ex. H). All of these monies and efforts have been forfeited by the Court's decision.
Yet, the Court made no findings as to how Doug' s actual damages are reasonably related to the
investment being forfeited by Vicki. It made finding as to what those sums might be, and failed
to determine whether those sums were exorbitant or arbitrary. Its holding that the forfeiture was
neither unconscionable nor a penalty is therefore not supported by the record and constitutes an
abuse of discretion. Consequently, the District Court's Order granting Douglas Visser a writ of
possession should be reversed.
iii. There was a Forfeiture Clause in the Stipulated Judgment.

It has been demonstrated that there was a contract between the parties and that Graves
applies to all contracts containing a fixed forfeiture or damage provision. Now, the salient
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question is whether the Stipulated Judgment, in fact, contained forfeiture or damage fixed by the
contract, and, if so, whether that provision was enforceable by the District Court.
The specific term of the Judgment granting Doug the right to a forfeiture is found on page
6 of the Stipulated Judgment, paragraph "F," which states:
Should Defendants fail to perform any obligation set forth above,
Doug shall be entitled to a Writ of Possession and a Judgment of
Quiet Title in and to all of the real property described in Exhibit
"A" hereto. Further, Plaintiff shall thereon be relieved of any
obligation to subdivide said property or to convey any portion
thereof to Vicki. The Court shall thereafter enter a Judgment of
Quiet Title in favor of Plaintiff, Douglas Visser, quieting any and
all claims of Vicki to the real property described in Exhibit "A"
upon such default or failure to perform my [sic] Defendants. Said
Judgment of Quiet Title and Writ of Possession shall include
direction to the Bonner County Sheriff or other authority to restore
possession of the premises by thereafter removing and disposing of
any and all personal property or inventory of Vicki upon the
premises with the proceeds thereof to be paid to the Lapham debt
as required by Lapham in a separate Modification of the Escrow
account.
(R. Vol. I, p. 94-95, ,r F).
A forfeiture is defined as the divestiture of property without compensation or the loss of a

right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty.
FORFEITURE, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). In the event of a forfeiture, title is
simultaneously transferred to another, such as the government, a corporation, or a private person.
Id.

Paragraph "F" of the Stipulated Judgment clearly grants Doug the right to divest Vicki's
interest in Lot 2.

Its function is to deprive Vicki of her right to rely upon the Stipulated

Judgment and causes her to lose all of the money and labor that she and the other Defendants
invested into the property without compensation. Furthermore, simultaneous with the divestiture
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of Vicki's right to use or to obtain compensation for her investment, the provision purports to
require a Court to quiet title in favor of Doug against any and all claims of Vicki to Lot 2.
Consequently, this provision squarely meets the definition of a forfeiture.
It should be noted that this particular provision goes beyond merely forfeiting Vicki's

right and interest in the subject matter of the contract (i.e., title to Lot 2), but also purports to
divest Vicki and Calvin Visser of all of their personal property located on the property as well.
iv. The Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment Between the Parties
in this Case is Unenforceable.

Actions to forfeit contractual rights of the defaulting party, pursuant to a forfeiture clause,
are addressed to the court's equitable discretion. Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451 , 272 P.2d 1020
(1954). "The Supreme Court reviews the district court's rulings on equitable remedies for an
abuse of discretion." O'Connor v. Harger, 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). The
standard of review for an abuse of discretion "is whether the court perceived the issue as one of
discretion, acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and reached its decision by an exercise
of reason." Readv. Harvey, 147 Idaho 364,369,209 P.3d 661 , 666 (2009).
Vicki asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in permitting forfeiture to occur
because the District Court did not act within the boundaries of its discretion or consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it. The District Court also
failed to reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
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1. Doug Waived his Right to Enforce the Forfeiture Provision.

Vicki argued that Doug waived his right to declare a forfeiture by repeatedly accepting
Vicki's late payments and failing to require strict adherence to the time frames included in the
Stipulated Judgment. (R. Vol. II, p. 377-380). The District Court did not address this argument
in either of its memorandum decisions.
The Judgment required Vicki to pay half of the Lapham Mortgage, and all but
approximately $30,000 of the original $180,000 balance owing by Vicki was paid. (R. Vol. I, p.
91-92,

,r

A(S)). Nearly all of those payments were late.

Defendants' Ex. C). In fact, the

payment ledger provided by Panhandle Escrow which was admitted at trial shows that at least
five late payments were made by Vicki and accepted by Doug. Id. Defendants' Exhibit C
indicates that late payments were made on February 13, 2014 for $6,800.00, February 28, 2014
for $53,500.00, May 5, 2014 for $2,500.00, and July 16, 2014 for $80,000.00.

Id.

These

substantial payments greatly enhanced the equity in both Lot I and Lot 2, and Doug effectively
took that equity when he unilaterally refinanced both lots, and refused to convey Lot 2 to Vicki.
In his first Motion for a Writ of Possession, filed on or about April 3, 2014, Doug did not
allege a failure to timely make payments under the Stipulated Judgment. (R. Vol. I, p. 102).
Instead, he argued that he was entitled to a writ of possession because Vicki was making
payments by way of personal checks to Doug' s attorney rather than having the contractor or
salvage purchaser pay Doug' s attorney directly. (R. Vol. I, p. 106). Despite their failure to
strictly comply with the terms of the judgment, Doug accepted all of these late, direct payments,
thereby benefitting by the increasing equity in his property. This includes the $80,000 paid by
Vicki on or about July 16, 2014, which was after the June 30, 2014 deadline set forth in the
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Stipulated Judgment. (See Defendants'Ex. C; R. Vol. I, p. 92

,r A(5)).

By accepting these late

payments, Doug waived his claim for strict compliance to the deadlines set forth in the
Judgment.
Where a contract for sale of real estate makes time of the essence,
and provides for a forfeiture of the vendee's rights for failure on
his part to make payments at certain times, a continued course of
conduct on the part of the vendor in failing to declare a forfeiture,
thereby leading the vendee to believe that the vendor waives a
strict compliance with the terms of the contract, works a waiver of
the vendor's right to declare a forfeiture, unless and until he
gives the vendee reasonable notice of his intention to do so, and
a reasonable opportunity to make the delinquent payments.
Sullivan v. Burcaw, 35 Idaho 755,763,208 P. 841, 843 (1922) (emphasis added).

The Judgment at issue here does not contain a clause indicating that time is of the
essence. By repeatedly failing to declare a forfeiture, Doug established a course of conduct in
which he led Vicki to believe he had waived strict compliance with the deadlines set forth in the
Stipulated Judgment.
Under such circumstances, this Court should hold that the conduct of Doug waived strict
compliance with the deadlines set forth in the Judgment. In King v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho 223, 118
P. 292 (1911), this Court long ago insisted that,
[T]he party claiming the benefit of a forfeiture must show himself
to be strictly within the terms of the instrument which confers that
right. He must act promptly in asserting his claim and his acts
relating thereto must be positive, unequivocal, and inconsistent
with the continuance of the contract. . . . When the defendant
informed Doug that he was unable to pay, and wanted more time,
stating that he thought he could possibly raise the money ... Doug,
if then determined to insist upon the forfeiture, ought to have said
so in positive and unequivocal terms. He ought to have informed
the defendant that he need not make any effort to raise the money
as the time had passed, and the money would not be received on
Saturday if tendered. On the contrary, he carefully refrained from
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giving express consent to .further time, but in his own mind did
consent . . . . He permitted the . defendant to engage in another
effort to raise the money in the belief that if secured Doug would
accept it. This attempt to hold on to the forfeiture and waive it does
not show such candor and fairness as the circumstances demanded.
He ought to be held to this waiver.
King v. Seebeck, 20 Idaho at 233-234, 118 P. at 295, quoting.from Cue v. Johnson, 73 Kan. 558,
85 P. 598 (1906).
Doug did not provide Vicki with notice of his intention to declare a forfeiture nor allow
her a reasonable opportunity to allow Vicki to pay the remaining $30,000. (R. Vol. III, p. 239, L.
4-14; p. 313, L. 4-6). Rather, Doug unilaterally refinanced the debt, encumbering both Lots 1
and 2. Nor did he attempt to pay his share of the debt by taking a loan out only on Lot 1. (R.
Vol. III, p. 88, L. 19-25). Therefore, the forfeiture provision is unenforceable and this Court
should reverse the District Court's Order.
2. The record is insufficient to Support the District Court's Conclusion
that the Forfeiture does not Constitute an Inequitable Penalty.

The District Court held that "when the equities are balanced, the forfeiture granted in
favor of Doug is not unconscionable and does not constitute and [sic] inequitable penalty." (R.
Vol. III, p. 570). However, this holding is not supported by the facts that were admitted. "[l]t is
for the trial court to determine under the facts of any particular case whether the amount
Stipulated as damages bears such a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained as to be
'
enforceable as a provision for
liquidated damages." Clampitt v. A.MR. Corp., 109 Idaho 145,

148, 706 P.2d 34, 37 (1985).

In this case, the District Court made no specific findings as to the reasonableness of the
relation between the amount forfeited by Vicki and the damages actually sustained by Doug. In
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fact, it made no specific finding as to the total amount forfeited by Vicki, even in a general sense,
or the amount of damage occasioned to Doug as a result of Vicki's breach of the Stipulated
Judgment, despite evidence of such damages having been presented at trial. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 310,
L. 13-15; p. 321-324; Defendants' Ex. H). Thus, it cannot be said that the District Court actually
balanced the equities or engaged in appropriate fact finding to determine whether the amount
Stipulated as damages bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained by Doug.
As noted above, the District Court did not engage in an analysis or make any finding as to
whether the provision was arbitrary.

The District Court held that the forfeiture was not

unconscionable, but failed to support that conclusion with any factual determinations or legal
analysis. (R. Vol. III, p. 570).
Accordingly, the District Court's refusal to grant relief from forfeiture to Vicki should be
reversed on the grounds that the record does not support such a decision.

3. The District Court did not Act According to the Appropriate Legal
Standard.
The District Court correctly perceived the issue of whether the provision constituted a
penalty as one of discretion (R. Vol. III, p. 570).

However, the District Court did not act

consistently with the legal standard, or come to its decision by an exercise of reason. The legal
standard available to the District Court with respect to this issue was set forth in Graves, as
explained and discussed in Section B above.
As noted in Section B, the District Court was required to determine whether the forfeiture

provision contained within the Stipulated Judgment amounted to a penalty. In order to reach a
conclusion, one way or the other, the District Court should have followed the standard

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 25

established in Graves and its progeny. The District Court should have considered whether the
damages fixed by the contract were arbitrary, whether they were reasonably related to Doug's
actual damages, and whether they were unreasonable.
Vicki put forward evidence and argument showing that the relief sought by Doug would
cause Vicki to forfeit approximately $236,000.00 in payments made towards performance of the
Stipulated Judgment. (Defendants' Ex. H).
The District Court's failure to take these facts into account and apply the correct legal
standard constitutes an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the Order forfeiting Vicki's right and
interest in Lot 2 should be reversed, and the District Court should be instructed to issue a new
order consistent with Graves and the facts presented at the evidentiary hearing, or to conduct an
additional evidentiary hearing if the District Court cannot resolve the issue from the facts
presently contained in the record.
4. The Damages Considered by the Court were Irrelevant.
In its second Memorandum Decision, the District Court found that Vicki had breached an
oral lease agreement causing the principal of the Lapham debt to rise and that Doug had made a
$14,591.74 payment on his 2009 tax bill. (R. Vol. III, p. 569). It is unclear if the District Court
considered these to be actual damages suffered by Doug or simply background facts, but it bears
mentioning that the Stipulated Judgment constitutes "a full, final and complete release of any and
all claims and causes of action against one another or any other party named herein or any claims
which could have been asserted herein." (R. Vol. I, p. 95, ,r G). Thus, the District Court should
not have considered any of these facts.
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In addition to these claims having been released, it appears that several of the facts the
District Court took into account were allegations made by Doug that were premised upon Vicki's
breach of an oral lease agreement. Not only were those claims settled by the MSA, they were
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, I.C. § 9-505(4).
Lastly, the evidence admitted at the evidentiary hearing regarding the oral lease
agreement and certain tax payments appear to have been elicited and admitted for the purpose of
giving the District Court background information, not as substantive evidence of the issues at
trial.
For example, counsel for Doug attempted to elicit an admission from Vicki Visser that
she had rented the property upon which she operated the Junkyard from Doug. Counsel for
Vicki objected:
MR. McLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, [I] object. Anything before the
settlement- before the Judgment isn't relevant.
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 331 , L. 5-12).
The Court overruled Mr. McLaughlin's objection on the basis that "the Court has to have
a little bit of background," but acknowledged that "it's not all relevant, it does help the Court to just to understand how we got where we are." (Tr. Vol. III, p. 332, L. 10-25).
Furthermore, when Doug testified about matters occurring prior to the execution of the
MSA, his attorney informed the court that he was only asking questions for the purpose of
providing background information:
I want to cover a little bit of background, just as quickly as
possible, as to how it came about that this lawsuit occurred,"
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 357, L. 1-6; p. 367, L. 8-25; p. 369-370).
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Finally, when Plaintiff's counsel objected to Vicki's testimony regarding the decree of
divorce, the following exchange took place:
MR. FEATHERSTON: Excuse me. I'm gonna object to any agreement that goes
back ten, literally ten years now to must be early 2005, late 2004, and the divorce
is merged into the Judgment of divorce-a decree of divorce which is an exhibit, I
think.
MR. McLAUGHLIN: Your Honor, I fully agree. I'm not offering it to indicate
or try to enforce any agreement. All I'm offering for is to give you some sense as
to my client's understanding on how we get-we got to this place. That agreement
wouldn't be effective probably for a number of reasons: Statute of fraud, statute
of limitations. All I'm doing is give the Court where my client's mind frame was
back then.
THE COURT: All right. I'll allow it. I let Mr. Visser give some background
with that caveat. Because certainly as I think Mr. McLaughlin just objected to
something, Mr. Featherston said the same thing, you're going outside these
documents, these documents are controlling so ...

(Tr. Vol. III, p. 459, L. 11-25; p. 460, L. 1-25).
Thus, the testimony at trial demonstrates that the District Court and the parties
understood that the claims and events occurring before the MSA and the Stipulated Judgment
were background information and not relevant to the District Court' s decision. It was error for
the District Court to base any part of its decision upon testimony which had been admitted for
background purposes.
5. The Court's Decision to Issue a Writ ofPossession was Arbitrary,
and Must be Overturned.

As set forth in Graves, a fixed forfeiture or damage provision cannot be arbitrary. This
Court has defined an arbitrary as something "done in disregard of the facts and circumstances
presented or without adequate determining principles." Enterprise, Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho
734, 536 P.2d 729 (1975).
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The damage provision fixed by the Stipulated Judgment does not

take into account any facts or circumstances surrounding actual damages sustained as a result of
breach, nor are there any adequate determining principles as to whether the forfeiture should be
allowed.

Rather, by the terms of the Stipulated Judgment, the forfeiture is automatically

enforceable by means of a writ of possession as a result of any breach, regardless of the
magnitude of the breach. The District Court's decision to enforce the forfeiture was likewise
arbitrary because it did not consider the relevant facts or circumstances regarding the relation
between Vicki's forfeited payments and labors, and Doug's actual damages.
The damage provision in the Stipulated Judgment is arbitrary and intended to function as
a penalty because it is applicable even where the breach is not material. The provision is clearly
intended to apply if Vicki fails to comply with any obligation set forth in the Stipulated
Judgment, no matter how trivial. Thus, Vicki's failure to remove all personal property from Lot
1, ignoring for now the fact that Doug intentionally acted to prevent Vicki from complying with
this obligation, triggered the forfeiture provision and permitted Doug to take and retain the
benefit of the entirety of Vicki's payments and efforts, without compensation of any kind for
such payments or improvements. Such a provision cannot be enforced, as explained in the
following case:
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Courts "refuse to enforce contract clauses that appear designed to
deter a breach or to punish the breaching party rather than
compensate the injured party for damage occasioned by the
breach." Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 927, 318 P.3d
910, 917 (2014) (quoting Magic Valley Truck Brokers, Inc. v.
Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982 P.2d 945, 952 (Ct.App.1999)).
When forfeiture is "simply a penalty invoked as a result of conduct
of one of the parties, the forfeiture will not be allowed." Foeller,
155 Idaho at 927,318 P.3d at 917 (quoting Fleming v. Hathaway,
107 Idaho 157, 161, 686 P.2d 837, 841 (Ct.App.1984)). Here, if
Giesler breaches the contract, Giesler loses his development costs
and the property will be listed for sale. This seems designed only
to persuade Giesler to complete the contract, and therefore would
be an unenforceable penalty clause.

Hull v. Giesler, 156 Idaho 765,780,331 P.3d 507,522 (2014).
Like the provision in Giesler, the damage provision in the Stipulated Judgment is not
structured to compensate Doug for his actual losses upon Vicki' s breach of the Stipulated
Judgment. Rather, by threatening to take everything Vicki had bargained for, and indeed, more
than Doug had bargained for, the provision was intended to compel Vicki to complete the
contract, and not to compensate Doug for his potential damages.
For these reasons, the provision not only functions as a penalty, but was clearly designed
for the purpose. When the District Court entered the Order granting Doug the writ of restitution,
it was enforcing a contractual penalty. Such an Order cuts against long established and well
recognized Idaho precedent. It is axiomatic that the fundamental purpose for awarding damages
for any breach of contract is to fully recompense the nonbreaching party for its losses sustained
because of the breach, not to punish the breaching party. See Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796,
801, 606 P.2d 90, 95 (1980). Therefore, the order granting Doug a writ of restitution should be
reversed.
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6. The Forfeiture Provision in the Stipulated Judgment is
Unconscionable and Exorbitant.
The District Court found that the damage provision was not unconscionable, but made no
finding as to whether the provision was exorbitant. (R. Vol. III. p. 570). "A trial court's finding
as to whether liquidated damages constitute an unconscionable penalty will not be overturned
unless the finding is clearly erroneous." Clampitt, 109 Idaho at 149, 706 P.2d at 38. The District
Court's finding should be overturned because it is clearly erroneous. There was no finding with
respect to whether the provision was exorbitant, and the Court engaged in no fact-finding or
analysis in support of its conclusion that the provision was not unconscionable.
The District Court found that Vicki breached two provisions of the Stipulated Judgment.
It found that she failed to pay off the remainder of the Lapham debt in a timely manner and
failed to fully vacate Lot 1 in a timely manner. (R. Vol. III, p. 568, ,r 20).
The damage provision is unconscionable and exorbitant because it permits Doug to
obtain a writ directing the Sheriff to not only restore possession of Lot 2 to him, but also to seize
and sell all of Vicki and Calvin Visser's personal property. Again, this provision is applicable
regardless of whether Doug had been actually damaged by Vicki' s breach. It is even more
unconscionable given that Vicki and Calvin lived and stored all of their personal property on Lot
2 at the time the agreement was entered into and at the time he sought to enforce the penalty. (R.
Vol. 111, p. 325, L.6-22; p. 326, L. 17-25).
The provision is unconscionable and exorbitant given the actual damages occasioned to
Doug. There is no evidence as to how Vicki's failure to timely pay off the remainder of their
share of the Lapham debt caused damage to Doug. As to Vicki's failure to fully vacate the
premises by the agreed upon date, Douglas testified as follows:
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MR. FEATHERSTON: All right.
premises, fully vacated, by April 30th?

Were they out of the

DOUGLAS VISSER: Not quite.
Q: What was left?
A: There was miscellaneous stuff in the back shop. There' s
most of a spray-in bed liner unit in the front shop and all the booth
that was made that way. There was household goods. Well no, no.
Excuse me. Those were taken out because they were put out on
the step and out into the yard and they were-after midnight, I
locked the door and they- they continued cleanin' that up.
(Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 371, L. 24-25; p. 372, L. 1-10).
Evidently, the only damage caused to Doug as a result of this breach is the fact that Vicki
or Calvin left a spray-in bed liner unit and a booth in the back shop. There was no testimony as
to whether this breach of the Stipulated Judgment damaged Doug, how it damaged Doug, or the
extent to which it damaged Doug. Further, the testimony clearly shows that Doug intentionally
prevented Vicki from removing the remainder of her personal property on Lot 1 by locking the
door after midnight. Consequently, the breach is not material. However, the Court found Vicki
in breach of the Stipulated Judgment, in part, for this very reason. To enforce the forfeiture
provision contained within the Stipulated Judgment for this breach is clearly exorbitant and
unconscionable, and the District Court' s order granting Doug a writ of restitution pursuant to this
illegal penalty provision should be reversed.
As to the District Court's finding that Vicki breached the Stipulated Judgment by
continuing to use a portion of the road located on Lot 1, there was no evidence that this damaged
Doug in any manner whatsoever. In fact, Vicki testified that she used only a small section of the
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that this
road, and no evidenc e was admitte d from which the District Court could have found
damage d Doug. (Plainti ff's Ex. 12; Tr. Vol. III, p. 204, L. 9-23).
ely
The only other breach of contract found by the Court was Vicki's failure to complet
ary
pay off her half of the Lapham Mortgage. Howeve r, four different witnesses at the evidenti
ed that Joe
hearing - Vicki Visser, Joe Lapham, Margare t Williams, and Rex Finney -all confirm
so long
Lapham was prepared to allow Vicki to refinance the remainder of her share of this debt
; p.
as Lot 2 could be used as collateral for that debt. (Plainti ff's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 104-105
178-179; p. 237, L. 11-17; p.307-308).

In fact, the Stipulated Judgme nt specifically

contemp lated exactly this condition, and required the parties to allow refinancing:
The parties shall (upon subdivision of the property as described
above) to thereup on divide the debt between Plaintif f and
Defendants using the respective Parcels 1 and 2 of the platted
property as collateral for each party's respective share of the
Lapham obligation and thereby releasing and extinguishing any
joint liability of Plaintif f Douglas Visser and Defendant, Vicki
Visser on the Lapham debt.
(Defend ants' Ex. 17) (emphasis added).
it
Douglas Visser, howeve r, refused to allow Vicki to have title to the property, or utilize
such as to
as collateral, until she performed additional tasks for which she was not obligated,
forth in
construct a new road, and to perform additional environmental tests upon Lot 1. As set
remainder
the following section of this brief, because Doug prevented Vicki from paying off the
Vicki had
of Vicki's share of the Lapham Mortgage, it was error for the Court to hold that
Moreov er,
forfeited her entire investment because of the failure to pay the entirety of this debt.
actually
the Court made no finding as to how Vicki' s breach of the Stipulated Judgme nt
by
damaged Doug, or whether such damage s were reasonably related to the amount forfeited
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Vicki. Consequently, the Court' s decision constitutes an abuse of discretion and should be
reversed.
b. The Court Erred in finding that Doug did not Prevent Vicki with Complying
with the Terms of the Judgment.

Vicki also asserts that the District Court erred by finding that Doug did not interfere with
Vicki's attempts to pay off her share of the Lapham Mortgage, as this finding is not supported by
the evidence, and was, in fact, directly contradicted by the admission of Doug himself, as well as
the testimony of three other witnesses. At the evidentiary hearing, Vicki argued that Doug was in
contempt of Court for encumbering Lots 1 and 2, as that prevented Vicki from using Lot 2 as
collateral to refinance her share of the Lapham Mortgage.
The duty of good faith and fair dealing is implied into every contract in this state, and
includes with it a duty to cooperate with the other party in furtherance of the objectives of the
contract. Dave's Inc. v. Linford, 153 Idaho 744, 752, 291 P.3d 427, 435 (2012). A party' s
breach of the contractual duty to cooperate triggers the doctrine of prevention. "The doctrine of
prevention is an equitable doctrine designed to excuse non-performance by the nonbreaching
party." Morton Buildings, Inc. v. Dept. of Human Resources, 695 P.2d at 450 citing 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 676 (3rd. ed. 1961). It is intended to provide a mechanism by
which the party desiring to perform may establish that the other party has breached the contract
before its completion, and may seek recompense for that breach. The fundamental purpose for
awarding damages for any breach of contract remains the same: to fully recompense the
nonbreaching party for its losses sustained because of the breach, not to punish the breaching
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party. See Anderson v. Gailey, 100 Idaho 796,801,6 06 P.2d 90, 95 (1980); Hirst v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 106 Idaho 792,683 P.2d 440 (Ct.App.1984).

The Supreme Court held in McOmber v. Nuckols, 82 Idaho 280, 353 P.2d 398 (1960),
that a plaintiff who imposed conditions which made performance by the defendant impracticable
could not recover damages. To excuse nonperformance, the conduct of the party preventing
performance must be wrongful, in excess of their legal rights, unjustified, or outside the
reasonable contemplation of the parties when the contract was executed. 17A C.J.S. Contracts§
468; Sullivan v. Bullock, 124 Idaho 738,742,8 64 P.2d 184, 188 (Ct. App. 1993).
In its First Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court found that Vicki had
"not fully satisfied all of [her] obligations under the terms of the Judgment," and therefore "Doug
was not required to convey title to Lot 2."

(R. Vol. III, p. 474).

Vicki moved for

reconsideration, pointing out that the District Court ignored evidence showing that Doug refused
to allow Vicki to use Lot 2 as collateral for a refinance until she had completed newly imposed
obligations that were not contained in the Stipulated Judgment. (R. Vol. III, p. 501-503). In its
Second Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court stated that it would not find that
Doug prevented Vicki from paying her share of the Lapham debt. (R. Vol. III, p. 566). The
District Court found that Doug was not required to allow Vicki to use Lot 2 as collateral until
Vicki had completely fulfilled her obligations under the Judgment. (R. Vol. III, p. 566). For
those reasons, the District Court denied Vicki's motion for reconsideration.
The evidence submitted at the evidentiary hearing cannot support the Court's finding that
Doug did not interfere with Vicki's ability to pay off her share of the Lapham Mortgage. Vicki
demonstrated that she had paid all but $31,850.45 of her share of the Mortgage. Vicki, as well as
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Joe Lapham, Margaret Williams, and Rex Finney, testified that Vicki and Joe Lapham had
reached an agreement whereby Mr. Lapham would refinance the remaining portion of Vicki's
share of the debt, using Lot 2 as collateral, which would have satisfied Vicki' s obligation.
(Plaintiff 's Ex. 4; Tr. Vol. III, p. 104-105; p. 178-179; p. 237, L. 11-17; p. 307-308). Utilizing
Lot 2 as collateral in this way was specifically provided in the Stipulated Judgment.
The parties shall (upon subdivision of the property as described
above) to thereupon divide the debt between Plaintiff and

Defendants using the respective Parcels 1 and 2 of the platted
property as collateral for each party's respective share of the
iapham obligation and thereby releasing and extinguishing any
joint liability of Plaintiff Douglas Visser and Defendant, Vicki
Visser on the Lapham debt.
(R. Vol. I, p. 92, ,r 5). (emphasis added).
Doug, however, refused to allow Vicki to convey Lot 2 as collateral for the loan, or to
convey Lot 2 to Vicki, unless and until Vicki performed tasks for which she was not obligated to
perform by the Stipulated Judgment. These additional tasks were clearly set forth in the letter of
August 27, 2014, from counsel for Doug to counsel for Vicki, in which Doug acknowledges that
"the Plat is complete and that Lot 2 can be deeded to your client, however she needs to perform
on the requirements of our agreemen t before the deed will be delivered ." (Plaintiff 'sEx. 4).
Doug then demands that Vicki build a new road, fully remediate Lot 1 with regard to any
environmental concerns, provide plans for a privacy fence, perform additional work on the
parking lot, obtain a new water connectio n for Lot 2, and pay $2,500 to Douglas Visser. Id.
Furthermore, Margaret Williams, Rex Finney, Joe Lapham, anc! Vicki Visser testify about the
additional requirements Doug was attemptin g to impose on Vicki before transferring title to Lot
2. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 128-129; p .179, L.7-23; p. 254, L.21-25, p.255, L.1-23; p. 308, L.17-25; p.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 36

309, L. 1-20; p.392, L.2-22; p. 417-418).

None of these "requirements" Doug attempted to

impose are found in the Stipulated Judgment.
Doug also testified at trial that when Vicki would ask Doug for title to Lot 2, he
responded by demanding that she first build a road.
Vicki testified this morning that she recalls talking to you at
Q.
a time where she says she asked you for a deed to Lot 2. Do you
recall that conversation?
I don't. She would always ask for that, as - as that passing
A.
a couple words would be said. But as far as a meeting to have a
meeting to discuss that, no. We didn't.
And did you -- how did you respond to her when she
Q.
would ask for a deed to the property?
A.

I would ask her when the road is gonna be built.

(Tr. Vol. III, p. 392, L. 12-22).
Thus, Doug admitted that he refused to transfer title to Lot 2 until Vicki built a road on
Doug's property. Yet, the Stipulated Judgment did not impose upon Vicki an obligation to build
Doug a new road, and Doug had no right to condition his compliance with the Judgment with
additional tasks for Vicki to accomplish. By Doug's own admission, therefore, he interfered
with Vicki's ability to pay off the remainder of her share of the Lapham Mortgage.
As described in the previous sections, Doug's refusal to allow Vicki to use Lot 2 as
collateral to refinance her remaining share of the Lapham debt, and locking the doors of the
garage at midnight so she could not finish vacating Lot 1, demonstrate that Doug breached his
duty to cooperate. Furthermore, in light of the language of the Stipulated Judgment, Doug's
behavior was unjustified and outside the reasonable contemplation of the parties when the
contract was executed.
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Doug's conduct was wrongful and in excess of his legal rights because he did not give
Vicki notice that he was going to encumber Lot 2. He testified that "after Vicki ruined the sale,"
he was done "helping her" and thereafter stopped communicating with her. (Tr. Vol. III, p. 403405; p. 443, L.1-8).

The "sale" referred to by Doug was an offer by a third party to purchase

Lots 1 and 2. (Id.; Tr. Vol. III, p.284, L.17-25, p. 285, L. 1-10).

Immediately after

Vicki "ruined the sale," Doug admits that he made efforts to block vehicular access to Lot 2."
(Tr. Vol. III, p. 393-396). Whether Doug's purpose was to exclude Vicki from accessing her
home or to prevent her running her business, this behavior is indicative of a dereliction of the
duty to cooperate.
With regard to the potential sale of Lots 1 and 2, Vicki was under no obligation to sell
and she undertook no action to ruin that sale other than to refuse to accept the offer. In fact, the
primary object that Vicki had bargained for in the Stipulated Judgment was title to Lot 2 so she
and her son could continue to operate their business. In retaliation for Vicki' s decision to decline
to sell Lot 2, Doug made good on his promise that he was done helping Vicki and "helped
himself' by refinancing the Lapham mortgage without any notice whatsoever to Vicki.
For these reasons, Vicki's nonperformance should be excused because Doug prevented
her from complying with the terms of the Judgment and Doug's actions were wrongful,
unjustified, in excess of his legal rights, and outside of the reasonable contemplation of the
parties when the contract was executed.
Doug' s actions put Vicki in a Catch-22 situation. She had obtained a commitment from
Joe Lapham to refinance the remainder of her obligation. However, Joe Lapham needed Lot 2 as
security for this commitment. At the same time, Doug refused to give Lot 2 to Vicki until she
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paid off the Lapham debt. However, Vicki and Mr. Lapham were not parties to a contract that
contemplated transferring title to property for refinancing purposes. Vicki and Doug, on the
other hand, were parties to such a contract; a contract that specifically contemplated these events.
Doug's refusal to cooperate with Vicki constitutes a breach of the judgment and excuses Vicki' s
nonperformance.
The facts here show that Vicki paid approximately $236,000.00 towards satisfaction of
the Stipulated Judgment, of which approximately $149,000 was paid to reduce the Lapham
Mortgage. (Defendants' Ex. H). Doug presented no evidence that he made more than $5,000 in
payments towards the Lapham debt, though he argued several of Vicki's payments should be
credited to his half of the debt. (R Vol. II, p. 342-343,

,r 2).

Although the District Court

declined to make a finding on whether those sums should have been credited to Doug or the
balance of each parties' obligation on the Lapham Mortgage at the time it was refinanced, the
argument advanced by Doug shows that his contribution towards the Lapham debt pales in
comparison to the amount expended by Vicki.
For the aforementioned reasons, Doug prevented Vicki's performance of her obligations
under the Stipulated Judgment. The District Court was not persuaded by these facts, but made
no findings with regard to them, even after Vicki specifically asked the court to make them. (R.
Vol. III, p. 501,

,r B).

The District Court, therefore, committed reversible error, and Vicki

respectfully requests that this Court reverse and remand.
c. Vicki Is Entitled to Attorneys Fees on Appeal.

The Stipulated Judgment contains an attorneys' fee clause. (R. Vol. III, p. 95, ,r H). If
Vicki prevails upon appeal, she is therefore entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal.
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V.

CONCLUSION.

For the foregoing reasons, the Appellants respectfully request that this Court reverse the
decision of the District Court.

DATED this 5th day of May, 2016.

To McLaughlin
omeys for Appellants
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On May 5th, 2016, I caused copies of the foregoing document to be served by the
following methods on the parties listed below as follows, which is the last known address for the
listed party:
Brent Featherston
Featherston Law Finn, Chtd.
113 South Second Avenue
Sandpoint, ID 83864

APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 41

' By Hand Delivery
By U.S. Mail
D By Overnight Mail
D By Facsimile Transmission
D Other_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

